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What is This?
Of Politics and Social Science
‘Totalitarianism’ in the Dialogue of David Riesman and Hannah Arendt

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Abstract: During the late 1940s and early 1950s, David Riesman and Hannah Arendt were engaged in an animated discussion about the meaning and character of totalitarianism. Their disagreement reflected, in part, different experiences and dissonant intellectual backgrounds. Arendt abhorred the social sciences, finding them pretentious and obfuscating. Riesman, in contrast, abandoned a career in law to take up the sociological vocation, which he combined with his own heterodox brand of humanistic psychology. This article delineates the stakes of the Arendt–Riesman debate by examining Arendt’s critique of social science and Riesman’s defence of a sociological interpretation of totalitarianism. In addition, the article argues that Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism misdescribed the nature of Nazi and Bolshevik societies in ways that damaged her political account more generally. Riesman intuited that weakness and, as the following article shows, modern historical research has confirmed it.

Key words: concentration camps, David Riesman, Hannah Arendt, social science, totalitarianism

Introduction

Aside from being classics in their fields, and bearing titles chosen by their publishers,1 David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd2 (1950) and Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism3 (1951) are works with little ostensibly in common. They examine different countries, focus on substantially different problems, and do so from radically different perspectives. Yet over an intense and remarkably creative four-year period that began in February 1947, Arendt (1906–75) and Riesman (1909–2002) jointly examined themes arising from their books (especially hers) in a dialogue that repays investigation for the light it sheds on the meaning, nature and limitations of ‘totalitarian’ regimes.

Typically, ‘totalitarianism’ is seen as a Cold War term and our attention is swiftly diverted to its use in that context – the diplomatic, moral and military struggle of the liberal democracies, led by the United States, against the Soviet

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Union and its satellites. My purpose in this article, however, is to consider another bone of contention. Riesman and Arendt had no objection to the term totalitarianism itself; on the contrary, they accepted it, duly fashioned, as a broadly apposite designation of the Bolshevist ('Stalinist') and National Socialist regimes. Where they diverged was on the discursive approaches that might most fruitfully be applied to understand the character and prospects of these totalitarian formations. On one side of the debate was Hannah Arendt’s sweeping claim, shared fully by her husband and sometime intellectual éminence grise, Heinrich Blücher, that social science in general, and sociology in particular, had failed miserably to explain the singular and unprecedented nature of totalitarian regimes. From that perspective, it was a short, if illogical, step to the extrapolation that social science concepts and assumptions were inherently incapable of grasping the trajectory, and of registering the depth, of the crisis that totalitarianism had visited on the 20th century. On the other side was the contention of writers such as Riesman (and Daniel Bell and Raymond Aron) that Arendt’s own account of totalitarianism was exaggerated; it simply failed to recognize the limitations of totalitarian regimes on which social science perspectives could shed considerable light. Or, in other words, Arendt’s monolithic repudiation of all approaches but her own left the investigation of totalitarianism sorely deficient in precisely those respects that social science was most amply provisioned.

In this article, I reconstruct the stakes of this dispute, highlighting, consecutively, Arendt’s critique of social science, Riesman’s sociological concerns in The Lonely Crowd, and – in that context – the critical encounter that took place between them on the subject of totalitarianism. Underlying the article is an argument that, for all its simplicity, has radical implications for the appraisal of Hannah Arendt’s work on totalitarianism. It runs something as follows. Every modern political theory beyond the most self-referential presupposes some attitude towards society, that is, towards the social relations that constitute the environment in which politics must operate. This environment includes, but is not limited to, a series of human relationships mediated by class position, occupational life, educational experience, religious confession, and civic and recreational association. To the extent that family life impinges on this nexus, it, too, assumes a social rather than simply ‘private’ or ‘domestic’ character (consider, for instance, the family business). Any particular society – a summary term for this nexus of relationships – is characterized by statuses, manners and practices through which people are both connected and separated and which reflect its broader traditions and culture. Modern politics – conceived both as action and as a set of institutions – is inevitably bound up with society insofar as it seeks to coordinate, guide, coerce, influence and change it. Equally, a cogent political theory depends on its being able to understand the social terrain in which politics is located and to which, broadly or specifically, it is addressed. Failure to understand salient and pertinent aspects of this terrain will weaken or disfigure the political theory in question.
To be more specific: Riesman’s critical analysis of Arendt’s political theory of Nazi Germany and Soviet Bolshevism was especially effective in the ability to intuit – for there was at that time little evidence to go on – that it rested on a defective understanding of totalitarian society and of what it means, more generally, to be a social agent able to play roles, don masks, and take cover in the interstices of a brutal system. Later, there will be occasion to examine what contemporary historians of everyday life have discovered about Germany and the Soviet Union during their totalitarian phases. We will see that their picture lends more credence to Riesman’s conjectures than it does to Arendt’s theory, and that it does so because of what it reveals about social existence under these regimes.

Totalitarianism and the Social Sciences

All readers of Arendt’s work are familiar with her oft-repeated claim that totalitarianism was an entirely unprecedented type of regime, qualitatively different from the despotisms, tyrannies and dictatorships it had, at least momentarily, superseded. This conviction was accompanied by the view that extant forms of social scientific explanation were condemned to misunderstand totalitarianism, a point she sought to drive home in a series of essays and lectures that appeared shortly before and after the publication of Origins. In ‘Social Science Techniques and the Study of Concentration Camps’ (1950), Arendt remarked that:

... every science is necessarily based upon a few inarticulate, elementary, and axiomatic assumptions which are exposed and exploded only when confronted with altogether unexpected phenomena which can no longer be understood within the framework of its categories.8

The concentration and extermination camps, she contended, were precisely the ‘unexpected phenomena’ that had exploded the assumptions of social science, ‘the “nightmare of reality” before which our intellectuals weapons have failed so miserably’.

The first assumption totalitarianism exploded was the idea that human conduct springs essentially from self-interested, instrumental and utilitarian considerations. Yet not only were the concentration camps ‘non-utilitarian’ – she adduced the ‘senselessness of “punishing” completely innocent people, the failure to keep them in a condition so that profitable work might be extorted from them, the superfluousness of frightening a completely subdued population’10 – the camps were also anti-utilitarian because the exterminatory program of the Nazi regime diverted valuable logistical and other resources from the war effort. ‘It was as though the Nazis were convinced that it was of greater importance to run extermination factories than to win the war.’11 Originally, the German camps, run by SA bullies and sadistic grudge-holders, had been built to imprison and intimidate the Nazis’ foes. But once the Nazis’ real enemies had been eliminated, the staff of the camps changed, as did their nature. SS guards were chosen on the basis of
physical and ‘racial’ criteria. They were in most respects ‘completely normal’, and committed their crimes ‘for the sake of their ideology which they believed to be proved by science, experience, and the laws of life’. Their job was to ensure that the ‘fabrication of corpses’ proceeded smoothly, ensuring ‘a regulated death rate and a strictly organized torture, calculated not so much to inflict death as to put the victim into a permanent status of dying’. ‘The concentration camps are the laboratories in the experiment of total domination’, determined to show that human spontaneity is capable of being altogether extinguished. The geographical isolation of the camps, and the deliberate stripping away of the juridical, moral, and individual personality of the victims were attempts to transform the unique human person ‘into a completely conditioned being whose reactions can be calculated even when he is led to certain death’. Indeed, what confronts the outside observer is the ‘complete senselessness’ of the Lager ‘where punishment persecutes the innocent more than the criminal, where labour does not result and is not intended to result in products, where crimes do not benefit and are not even calculated to benefit their authors’. Being ‘normal men’, accustomed to the precepts of western civilization, social scientists are ill equipped to explain a hellish world where motives of utility and even of passion are characteristically absent. It follows that categories based upon these precepts and presuppositions will necessarily fail to grasp the ‘insane consistency’ of the camps and the enormity of the deed committed in them – a crime beyond crime that ‘the Ten Commandments did not foresee’ and for which the perpetrators showed so little remorse.

At this point it is worth pausing to note a couple of curiosities about Arendt’s argument. First, though she claims to be writing about ‘social science techniques’, her actual discussion contains no mention of them. Indeed, behaviourist psychology appears to be Arendt’s main target, and what she offers is a metacritique of it. Perhaps, with some inventiveness, it might be possible to reformulate her remarks to indict models of economic man or of rational choice. Even so, it is hard to see how criticisms of instrumentalism could sensibly be extrapolated to sociology – a discipline that for the most part has been strenuously opposed to ‘utilitarian’ explanations: Durkheim, Weber and Talcott Parsons all offered trenchant alternatives to them. Second, to the extent that the death camps were unprecedented, it follows that every mode of cognition, not simply sociology’s, has been thrown into question. And this is exactly what Arendt argues elsewhere, and why she punctuates her analysis with formulations – ‘ideological nonsense’, ‘a world of the dying in which nothing any longer made sense’, ‘fabricated senselessness’, ‘human-made hell’, ‘atmosphere of unreality’, ‘insane consistency’ – that stress the horrendous absurdity of camp existence. However, if the camps confounded all conventional social, political, legal and ethical notions, and not simply those articulated by the social sciences, we need to know more about the specific ways in which social science has failed.

194 Arendt focused on two aspects of social scientific enquiry that she believed to
be systematically obfuscating. The first she called ‘functionalism’, the tendency to reduce unique events, episodes and institutions to epiphenomenal permutations of structural forces. Such a strategy – whose original formulation she traced to Marx – both impedes the comprehension of historical contingency while also encouraging social scientists to neglect the substantial, elemental reality of the phenomena they are viewing. In a similar way – and this is the second predilection Arendt abhorred – social scientists were far too quick to assume that contemporary political events could readily be accommodated by conventional concepts or through stock analogies. So, for instance, the concentration camps may be depicted as the latest mode of slavery, or totalitarian regimes envisaged as an extreme kind of dictatorship no different in essentials from the familiar lineage of oppressive governments. Arendt was equally convinced that social scientists showed a disagreeable propensity to impose well-established ideal types on what were essentially fugitive and unparalleled phenomena. It is clear from her correspondence with Heinrich Blücher that ideal-type analysis, and the neo-Kantian underpinnings that inform it, were in principle repugnant to Arendt’s own investigative procedure. Yet Weber himself is not the object of her critique. Instead she accuses authors such as Hans Gerth of misapplying Weberian categories, extrapolating them to circumstances and persons in an egregiously simplistic way. Gerth’s characterization of the Nazi party as a combination of charisma and bureaucracy Arendt considered especially inappropriate, even though it was specifically endorsed by no less an authority than Franz Neumann. Hitler, Arendt argued, was no man of destiny, no hero with miraculous gifts, but instead a hollow figure who personified the movement he served which, in turn, indefatigably undermined rational bureaucratic forms of organization. Weber’s ideal types were utterly useless in this context. So, too, were historical analogies, a conviction that may have been aimed at Franz Neumann’s claim, absurd for Arendt, that ‘National Socialism has revived the methods current in the fourteenth century’ which ‘saw the first attempt to establish a kind of fascist dictatorship’ in Rome under the domination of Cola di Rienzo.

The Background to David Riesman’s Engagement with Arendt

Of Arendt’s early American interlocutors, none was more responsive and discerning than David Riesman. Their association began with an introductory letter from Riesman to Arendt on 27 February 1947 commending her recent writings in Partisan Review on ‘nationalism, racialism, and power generally’ and asking her opinion of Hobbes. For the next five years, while both scholars consolidated their reputation as major public intellectuals, Riesman provided Arendt with encouragement and provocation.

Background, politics and sensibility furnished some common coordinates: their
secularized Jewishness, their opposition to a unitary Israeli state, their concern to come to grips with the experience of totalitarianism, and their ambivalence towards ‘the corrosive acids of aggressive secularism’. Yet, in other respects, they were strange intellectual bedfellows. Arendt loathed social science; Riesman sought to develop and practise it intelligently. Arendt was above all a political writer, not an academic, for whom the university was a secondary and erratic site of convenience; Riesman, in contrast, spent most of his creative adult life at the universities of Chicago and Harvard, combining free-spiritedness and eclectic interests with a strong commitment to the teaching of undergraduate students.

Arendt’s major anxiety turned on the evisceration of the political realm and the continuing presence of totalitarian ‘elements’ in society; Riesman worried more about the danger of a nuclear cataclysm. Arendt distrusted all forms of psychological speculation; Riesman, an analysesand and protégé of Erich Fromm, believed that the insights of humanist psychology were vital for understanding one’s own place in the world and social character. Moreover, from the beginning, it is evident that the two writers’ appreciation of their respective magnum opera was asymmetrical: Riesman was always the more generous and assiduous discussant. As time passed, these and other differences became more evident and the relationship cooled. But, during its peak, Riesman’s engagement with Arendt’s work was as keen as it was insightful.

What was the circuitous path that led Riesman to Arendt? Despite ecumenical interests that embraced politics and journalism, Riesman’s graduate academic work was centred in law: a training at Harvard Law School (1935–6) prefaced a year clerking for Louis D. Brandeis, who was at that time a justice of the US Supreme Court. Everything seemed to point to a legal career. Following his spell with Brandeis, Riesman briefly entered private legal practice in a small Boston law firm, before proceeding to teach law at the University of Buffalo (1937–41) and then, at the outset of America’s entry into the war, becoming for a few months a deputy assistant attorney of New York County. But law was not to be Riesman’s passion. He yearned for colleagues with whom he could teach and from whom he could learn the craft of interdisciplinary social research. Soon, thanks to the good offices of Edward Shils, he discovered both at the University of Chicago, where Riesman arrived to take up employment in January 1946. Colleagues at the College of the University of Chicago included, aside from Shils himself, Milton Singer, Daniel Bell, Gerhard Meyer, Frank Knight, Abram Harris, and Sylvia Thrupp, an academic grouping that ensured an omnivorous diet of philosophy, psychology, anthropology, economics and sociology. Riesman also benefited in Chicago from the seminars of such innovators in community studies and field methods research as, respectively, Lloyd Warner and Everett C. Hughes; and from the presence of Clyde Hart, director of the National Opinion Research Center, who stimulated Riesman’s growing interest in public opinion and survey research.

Soon an opportunity emerged to put these varied interdisciplinary research
interests to work. With the encouragement of Harold D. Lasswell and Eugene V. Rostow, Riesman was invited by the Committee on National Policy at Yale to conduct research on any aspect of national policy he found pertinent, though one preferably in the field of public opinion and mass communications; a leave of absence from Chicago facilitated the challenge. In the fall of 1947 Riesman arrived at Yale and in January 1948, aided by Nathan Glazer, began his investigation by poring over interviews collected by the eastern office of the National Opinion Research Center. His curiosity was first aroused by the observation that most American respondents wished to avoid at all costs the semblance of apathy. The frank admission 'don’t know' on an interview questionnaire appeared to be an abhorrent or embarrassing alternative to stating an answer confidently – even when such a reply clearly exceeded the respondents’ knowledge or experience. Holding an opinion was viewed as a kind of entitlement. Interviews collected for C. Wright Mills were another useful resource for Riesman and Glazer who initially coded them under a binary they called ‘conscience directed’ and ‘other directed’. Then, joined by Reuel Denney, Riesman and his collaborators began to conduct interviews of their own, teasing out of them a ‘gestalt’ that would illustrate ‘social character’. As Riesman remarked, in a 10-year retrospective essay on *The Lonely Crowd*, ‘our effort . . . was to deal with an historical problem that was broader than genitality, though narrower than fate’. Refracting his interviews of modern Americans through the neo-Freudian psychoanalytic theories of Erich Fromm and Erik H. Erikson, on the one hand, and the ‘culture and personality’ perspective pioneered by anthropologists such as Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry Murray, on the other, Riesman arrived at the distinction between ‘inner directed’ (self-reliant, psychologically rigid, politically indignant) and ‘other directed’ (eager to please, emotionally pliable, politically detached) social character types.

**The Dialogue**

I feel you have accomplished a great work of the human spirit. (Riesman to Arendt, 24 August 1948)

It was during the period that Riesman was working on *The Lonely Crowd* that he and Arendt began a serious correspondence. If the letters digitized in the Hannah Arendt Papers represent a mostly complete record of their epistolary conversation, it appears that, initially, it was Riesman’s work that was the focus of attention. Even here, however, there is an inkling of a disagreement about Soviet totalitarianism that became more pointed in subsequent correspondence. In a letter of 21 May 1948 Arendt responds to some ‘outlines’ Riesman had sent her by commending his concept of the ‘autonomous’ inner-directed type (which she prefers to ‘Max Weber’s “protestant”’), offering some remarks on the distortions to which interviews are prone, and making two observations pertinent
to totalitarianism. First, Arendt approves of the distinction in the draft of *The Lonely Crowd* between 'apathetic' (tradition and other-directed) and 'indignant' (waning inner-directed) types and agrees, further, that indignation is essentially a non-political attitude. Worse, to the extent that indignant people reject the world and its limitations, they are attracted to the grandiose claims of totalitarian movements:

You remember, of course, that the rise of the fascist movements was not determined by adherents gained from other parties, but simply by the extent to which people who had never voted, could be mobilized. Your differentiation between indignation and apathy might make it possible to calculate the totalitarian potential in every country.  

Second, Arendt queries a formulation Riesman furnished in one of his outlines that depicted contemporary Russia as nurturing a ‘marketing type’ highly sensitive to success and to the judgements of others. Such a designation, Arendt protests, minimizes the extent to which the modern Russian has adapted to totalitarian conditions. A more apposite description, anticipated by Hobbes, for this ‘new type of man who wants only to fit’, is a ‘functioning type’ whose ‘only ideal of himself is to be well adjusted, to fit well, and whose only ideal of life is to go on functioning unto death, that is, for whom spontaneity no longer exists’. This functioning type is not motivated by the prospect of success because, in Russia, ‘success has no longer anything whatsoever to do with what one does oneself, but is simply determined by good or ill luck’.  

Ten months later, Arendt returned to the issue of apathy by distinguishing with greater precision two kinds of attitude it allows: that of the person who feels well integrated into, and sufficiently represented by, the political order, and ‘the resentful apathy of modern masses who feel that this whole game really does not concern them at all’. Moreover, it is a mistake to assume that those who abstain from voting, or who vote irregularly, are disenchanted with the system per se; on the contrary, they may simply feel that political arrangements work well enough without them and that, by world standards, modern times for Americans are better than satisfactory. By the same token, it is an error, Arendt maintains, to assume that such individuals are not good citizens. ‘I know of people who never voted and still wrote outraged letters to Congressmen and even the President when American citizens of Japanese origins were interned.’  

Another bone of contention for Arendt was the tendency of Riesman to emphasize the intimate liaison between politics and a healthy personality, to suggest, in other words, that politics belongs ‘to those individual needs without which one is not a well-rounded personality or has not developed all of one’s potentialities’. Arendt objects that, even for an engaged individual like herself, it is ‘good books, good music, and good friends’ that meet her personal needs, not politics. In the political arena, people meet as formally equal citizens who inhabit a world in common, despite, by the nature of things, diverging in countless other ways. Protection and concern for the well-being of this ‘world’, rather than individual
fulfilment or self-realization, is the presupposition of political life.\textsuperscript{51} Personal satisfaction ‘in political activities is, it seems to me, the psychological prerequisite of the man who makes politics his career, the statesman, the politician, the diplomat etc., but not of citizens’\textsuperscript{52}

Riesman responded to Arendt’s comments by accepting some of her strictures on the limitations of the interview technique and by also agreeing that the ‘indignant person is ripe for totalitarian movements. Before I had your letter, I had just completed a case study of the sort just mentioned where this point is established concretely for a young Stalinist’.\textsuperscript{53} On Arendt’s ‘functioning type’, Riesman wishes to reflect more.\textsuperscript{54} But his main concern in those early days was to recruit Arendt, a ‘historian’,\textsuperscript{55} to survey comparatively the characterological terrain. In November 1948, Riesman attempted to procure a grant between $500 and $600 on Arendt’s behalf that would permit her ‘to write an historical chapter, dealing with the problems of tracing changing character structure in the Western world’. In such wise, the collaboration ‘might help to end the isolation between history and social psychology’.\textsuperscript{56}

Ironically, Riesman could not have known that with each clarificatory statement of his project, and with each apparent inducement, Arendt must have been further repulsed from collaboration. Arendt had as little time for ‘social psychology’, indeed for psychology \textit{tout court}, as she did for ‘the sociology of knowledge’, another of Riesman’s interests.\textsuperscript{57} Moreover, while Riesman was disarmingly frank that the interview component of\textit{The Lonely Crowd} was subsidiary to the team’s own personal ‘experiences of living in America – the people we have met, the jobs we have held, the movies we have seen’\textsuperscript{58} – this did not suggest a nonchalance towards rigorous methodology per se. Far from it, Riesman evinced a deep interest in methodological questions, and kept abreast of the latest techniques in interviewing, survey and market research.\textsuperscript{59} Arendt, conversely, was deeply suspicious of the ‘behavioural sciences’. In the ‘conceptual swamps’ of the sociologists and psychologists, she complained to Karl Jaspers, ‘everything founders and sinks’, and while those professional obfuscators ‘are only a symptom of the mass society . . . they play an independent role as well’.\textsuperscript{60}

But if formal collaboration was not to be, Riesman nonetheless took great pains to study Arendt’s work closely and to convey his enthusiasm for its remarkable qualities. On Arendt’s analysis of imperialist ‘expansion’, he declared himself to be ‘very much stimulated’,\textsuperscript{61} a condition that was only heightened once he saw the draft manuscript of part III of\textit{Origins}.\textsuperscript{62} ‘I am simply overwhelmed by your vision’, he gushed after reading Arendt’s discussion of the relationship between ‘elite and mob’.\textsuperscript{63} Four months later, reflecting on the danger of mass superfluity, he confessed ‘It’s not your fault that your book made such an impression on me that I keep thinking about it and keep thinking of new problems to throw at you’.\textsuperscript{64}

Yet as Riesman reflected on Arendt’s key propositions in\textit{Origins}, he became increasingly sceptical of their cogency.

His chief disagreements with her centred on the limits, fault lines and disloca-
tions of totalitarian power. That Hitler and Stalin were motivated by fanatical and evil objectives, Riesman was in no doubt. But he cautioned against a view that ascribed to them a degree of calculation, a ‘malign logic’,\textsuperscript{65} that took little account of happenstance. ‘You assume . . . that the Nazis knew at the beginning what they wanted at the end’, Riesman wrote to Arendt on 8 June 1949, but were they not like upwardly mobile youth who find themselves ‘surprised and unprepared by the rapidity’ of their ascent and who are then compelled to improvise their next move?\textsuperscript{66} Repeatedly, Riesman accused Arendt of treating ‘an accident as a rational calculation,’\textsuperscript{67} of analytically marginalizing the bureaucratic morass and conflicting interests in which every totalitarian plan is entangled.\textsuperscript{68} ‘The danger of assuming that what happened had to happen (which is different from assuming that one can explain it retrospectively) always confronts the historian who attempts to be more than a narrator of antiquities.’\textsuperscript{69} Riesman’s charge was more damaging than it first appeared for had not Arendt attacked social science precisely for its over-rationalized and deterministic view of human conduct? Now Riesman was accusing her of recapitulating the mistakes of the tradition she assailed.\textsuperscript{70}

A corollary of an instrumentalist view of totalitarianism was the marked tendency to depict it as omnipotent, a portrayal that Riesman believed to be both erroneous and dangerous. It is not only that the projects of a monomaniac or a clique are constrained by the environment in which they ricochet. Whatever the politburo’s ambitions and its demands for unconditional obedience, it cannot escape the limits – ‘jurisdictional dispute, personal caprice and connection, or luck’\textsuperscript{71} – that constantly frustrate its objectives. It is also that a perception of omnipotence ‘greatly overestimate[s] the capacity of totalitarianism to restructure human personality’.\textsuperscript{72} The German character structure after the war did not appear to be appreciably different from that before it.\textsuperscript{73} And even the terror in the Soviet Union had not been able to ‘destroy all bonds of organization among its victims’.\textsuperscript{74} To accept, or suggest, the possibility of omnipotence was to ‘subtly succumb to the appeal of an evil mystery; there is a long tradition of making Satan attractive in spite of ourselves’.\textsuperscript{75} The direct target of these comments is Orwell’s \textit{Nineteen Eighty Four}, a book that Riesman described as ‘sadistic’ and ‘symptomatic’, a ‘fantasy of omnipotent totalitarian impressiveness which I think may itself, among those who admire efficiency and have little faith in man, be an appeal of totalitarianism for those outside its present reach’.\textsuperscript{76} But it is plausible also to believe that Arendt herself did not escape Riesman’s objections.

In \textit{Origins} and elsewhere,\textsuperscript{77} Arendt portrays concentration camp inmates as utterly helpless and devoid of agency, save for their general human characteristics of spontaneity, plurality and unreliability that the regime busily attempts to efface. The camps are institutions that not only ‘kill the juridical person in man’,\textsuperscript{78} but also ‘murder . . . the moral person in man’\textsuperscript{79} and destroy man’s ‘unique identity’.\textsuperscript{80} In fairness, Arendt states that total domination cannot change humanity but only destroy it.\textsuperscript{81} Yet this qualification stands uneasily with other remarks of
hers that suggest the Nazis did in fact succeed in metamorphosing their captives. ‘Actually’, Arendt observes, ‘the experience of the concentration camps does show that human beings can be transformed into specimens of the human animal’, while elsewhere she describes the death factories as producing a ‘primal equality’ in which humans become ‘like cattle, like matter, like things that had neither body nor soul; nor even a physiognomy upon which death could stamp its seal’. And regarding totalitarian societies at large – that is, social relations beyond the camps – Arendt emphasizes the role of an ideological ‘supersense’ that annihilates ‘common sense’, and imposes a logical consistency on experience that is thoroughly spurious. Later, she elaborated on this argument by depicting totalitarian societies as dominated by ideology and ‘total terror’. 

To be sure, Arendt never subscribed to a dystopian view of a globe fully dominated by totalitarian powers. By the time her correspondence with Riesman began, she had seen the obliteration of Nazi Germany and was under no illusion that Bolshevism could conquer the whole earth. But within already established totalitarian societies, Arendt gives not a single example of individuals who, in some part, escaped its ambitions to dominate them utterly. Similarly, she offers no clue of the furtive stratagems by means of which individuals sought to retain their sanity or exercise their agency. The result is a picture of human life that is ‘monolithic’, relentlessly bleak, indeed lifeless, of a system that appears to operate under its own laws. Riesman’s insight that ‘totalitarian control was an unreachable ideal’, that there was a difference between ‘inefficient Stalinism and less efficient Nazism’ opened him, he remarked in one retrospective essay, to ‘attacks then and thereafter from often newly zealous anticommunists’. Nonetheless, he refused to believe that totalitarian systems ‘would forever remain unchangeable from inside’. 

That insight stimulated Riesman’s curiosity in the everyday strategies and ruses that actors employ to evade totalitarian ideology and brute terror. Arendt’s abstract Augustinian idea of freedom as a ‘new beginning’ was all well and good, but Riesman wished to show how a liberty of sorts was actually exercised in existing totalitarian societies, to demonstrate, in other words, the ‘sheer unheroic cussed resistance to totalitarian efforts to make a new man’. And here his native discernment, combined with a recently acquired training in social science, gave him a perspective on totalitarian conditions that was far more politically astute than Arendt recognized. The University of Chicago, where Riesman came up to speed on social scientific methods, was the heartland of American sociological ethnography. Once at Yale, the interviews that formed the basis of *Faces in the Crowd* indicated the malleability of human beings, but also their ingenious responses to social pressures. All this suggested to Riesman, as he turned to consider totalitarian societies, that everyday, routine human pliability was a double-edged sword. On the one side, it facilitated the hubristic objectives of those who sought to refashion human beings for the totalitarian project. On the other side, it was precisely this flexibility that enabled totalitarian subjects to survive within
the fissures of the system: to cooperate without being cooperative, to obey devoid of enthusiasm, to perform like dutiful citizens while remaining inwardly sceptical. We often fail to appreciate, he remarked, that a person’s capacity ‘to fit, part-time, into such a world is what saves them from having to fit into it as total personalities’. That extends to the ‘ability of human beings to dramatize, to play roles, to behave in ways that seem contradictory only if we do not appreciate the changes in scene and audience’.

Riesman knew what he was talking about: a visit to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1931 apprised him of the manner in which totalitarian subjects ‘develop ritualized ways of handling their political exhortations without inner conviction’. In two separate recollections of that trip that, parenthetically, recalled his disdain for Communist fellow travelers, Riesman drew a social landscape that he had first sketched in the exchanges with Arendt. On hard-sleeper train rides, in animated conversations with such luminaries as Karl Radek (later liquidated), and during a spell in hospital being treated for a knee injury, Riesman discovered a society that combined fear with stoicism, monumental disorder and rampant corruption, a configuration that in its own curious way offered a sanctuary from the terror and ideological indoctrination that Arendt highlighted. The Soviet experience revealed ‘that in a large, incipiently industrial society no amount of terror could create complete internalized belief and that at the margin there could even be disobedience’.

Extrapolating from that experience in a 1952 meeting of the American Committee on Cultural Freedom, at which Arendt, Bruno Bettelheim and Nathan Leites were present, Riesman urged his colleagues to consider ‘some of the defenses people have against totalitarianism’. Chief among them was neither republican pride nor virtue but the ‘apathy, corruption, free enterprise, crime’ that was endemic to totalitarian societies. Such features did not challenge the totalitarian system, and may even have reinforced its workings by enabling people to compromise with ‘the system as a whole’. But they did enable their subaltern agents, through a combination of ingenuity and withdrawal, to engage in what Riesman called ‘resistance quiescences’: those ‘quieter modes of resistance’ in which people bow their heads in mock mental obeisance but refuse ‘to internalize the system’s ethical norms’. Riesman made a similar point in a review of Margaret Mead’s Soviet Attitudes towards Authority. After noting that the ‘human being in the USSR appears to fight back and to find in apathy and petty deception the sovereign remedies against the great deceptions and impressiveness of ideology’, he invoked this instructive, though restrained, contrast:

In its style and its conclusions, [Mead’s book] stands in a paradoxical relation to Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism. From the latter book, impassioned and lyrical, emerges a picture of nightmarish police efficiency, applied to utterly diabolic and wild ends; from the former, we get a picture of barely averted chaos, struggling with realistic ends such as production and rearmament. Dr. Mead’s interdisciplinary analysis in terms of social structure and motivation may tend to over-interpret Soviet officialdom as, not ‘just
like us', but as understandably different – too understandably; whereas Dr. Arendt’s more mystical insistence of the savagery of the society may slightly overestimate the power of men permanently to transform their victims into beasts: the relatively undestroyed humanity of major elements in the Soviet population is for me the most encouraging conclusion of the Mead book. Thus, in spite of mutual suspicion and ceaseless fear of betrayal precisely by those who are most close to one, friendship seems not wholly to have perished but even at times to appear as a defense against the terror.100

Riesman acknowledged that there was no way of knowing what proportion of people had managed to defend itself, unobtrusively, against the totalitarian onslaught. But one possible index of a regime’s inability to penetrate all sectors of society was the presence of corruption – that great ‘antidote to fanaticism’ – and the apparent impossibility, despite numerous campaigns, to eliminate it.101 ‘Monetary rewards have their own logic’, especially under conditions of scarcity and a black market where managers are expected to meet quotas. The attitude of business as usual is ‘a wonderful “charm” against ideologies’ because it expresses the real exigencies of people’s lives102 and shows the lack of efficiency of totalitarian domination.103 In a letter to Arendt, Riesman further distinguished between types of corruption. He remarked:

Corruption makes the Nazis less totalitarian since one can buy ancestry, a little freedom, exile, and gravy. Communist corruption is different. It is not personal and individual but rather the stealing of parts in factories, etc. Corruption, moreover, is a human vice as against the inhuman vices of totalitarianism. It prevents the regime from being totally impressive ideologically, since the swindle is evident.104

Arendt replied to a number of Riesman’s criticisms both in the correspondence and during a meeting of the American Committee on Cultural Freedom in November 1951 at which he was present. She conceded that her portrayals of Hitler and Stalin might have exaggerated the extent of their calculation – ‘I am trying to tone these passages down’, she wrote to Riesman in June 1949 – and acknowledged the ‘stubbornness of reality which filters back into the totalitarian fiction’. Nonetheless, she went on to say, in social constructionist vein, that reality itself requires safeguarding if it is not to be destroyed. This was an oblique reference to her contention that totalitarian regimes were actually in a position to fabricate reality to an unprecedented degree. Hence the Nazis were able to prove that Jews were inhuman by creating the camps that produced that inhumanity. Similarly, they ‘instituted chaos to show they were right when they said that Europe had only the alternative between Nazi rule and chaos’.105 As for corruption, Arendt agreed about its humanizing potential but believed its significance to be negligible both in Germany, where one was unable to buy ancestry, and in Russia where the falsification of accounts by factory managers was ‘swindle’ rather than ‘corruption’; that is, it took place as part of a carefully orchestrated fantasy that allowed the regime to liquidate managers at will. The only exception of any significance to this pattern was the concentration camp, where corruption ‘plays an all-important role’ as a means of demoralizing its inmate population.
Or, at least, this is what Arendt maintained in the letter from which I have been quoting. Yet in the Cultural Freedom meeting she appears to have revised, or at least qualified, this argument. There, Riesman records her saying that the degree of prisoner rule and corruption that developed in the ‘camps described by [Eugen] Kogon and [David] Rousset were exceptions, and that in most [cases] no such prisoner ingenuities and defenses developed’. Riesman was sceptical. He was right to be so. The German camps Arendt knew most about when she wrote *Origins* were those of Dachau and Buchenwald, the institutions in which her chief sources – Kogon, Rousset and Bettelheim – were incarcerated. Of the ‘eastern’ camps in Poland, she had little information and, perhaps unsurprisingly, was not familiar with Primo Levi’s *Survival in Auschwitz*, first published in a print run of 2500 copies in 1947. Yet corruption and Kapo rule were rampant in Auschwitz. Primo Levi says of the Lager that it was a place ‘wholly devoid of free will, as our every action is, in time and place, the only conceivable one’. To that extent, Arendt’s analysis appears to be vindicated. Yet Levi also examines in detail the stratification order and the endemic venality of the camp, together with the survival strategies of those who, for instance, traded their meager belongings on the ‘Exchange Market’ furthest away from the Nazi huts, despite the ‘frequent swoops of Kapos or Blockälteste’.

Equally, Arendt’s contention that human uniqueness was obliterated is contradicted by Tsvetan Todorov’s analysis of survivor testimonies. This shows that, despite everything, a measure of ethical life survived in the camps: that alongside ‘vital values’ – modes of individual survival – stood ‘moral values’, a tenacious belief that ‘staying human is more important than staying alive’; and that one defends one’s humanity through the practice of ‘ordinary virtues’ such as keeping clean, caring for others and continuing to exercise the life of the mind.

Arendt’s depiction of the wider German society, infused by total terror, was also hyperbole – just as Riesman suspected and as subsequent research has confirmed. Naturally, those who opposed, or seemed to oppose, Nazi rule were violently hunted down and destroyed, but Arendt’s concern in *Origins* was not with these islands of dissent. On her account, Germany only became fully totalitarian once open rebellion was eliminated. Yet if that is the case, most ‘ordinary’ Germans did not know that they were living in a terrorized society. First, Germans who were neither clandestine Communists, Jews, radical priests, Jehovah’s Witnesses nor free masons did not emerge as Nazi targets and, consequently, felt safe. Second, the majority of Germans supported the regime and voluntarily complied with edicts they deemed legitimate. Finally, complaints about, and frustration towards, the regime were routinely ignored by the Gestapo, whose lack of resources compelled them to discriminate between pesky grumblers and determined adversaries. The underfunded and undemanned secret police was hardly ‘the superefficient and supercompetent’ service Arendt perceived it to be. Consider, for instance, Eric Johnson’s meticulous study of the Krefeld, Bergheim and Cologne Gestapo, in which the author observes that Nazi terror,
far from being ‘blanket, indiscriminate’, was above all selective, a fact that ‘helps to explain its success’:

Nazi Germany was . . . a police state, but one that allowed most of its citizens considerable room for their regular activities and for the venting of everyday frustrations . . . [M]ost Germans may not even have realized until very late in the war, if ever, that they were living in a vile dictatorship. They knew there were victims . . . but they perceived most of [them] as criminals with whom they had little or nothing in common. By their own admission on our surveys and in our ordinary interviews, the great majority of ordinary Germans believed that they had little reason to fear the Gestapo or the concentration camps.115

My point is not that Arendt was completely unaware of this situation. It is more that she took little interest in it. As a result, the sociology of everyday life in totalitarian societies is never integrated into her political analysis; had it been, Arendt would have been compelled to qualify, and perhaps reconfigure, her terror–ideology couple. Worse, her understanding of quotidian existence was actually impeded by two concepts – atomization and classlessness – that rendered sophisticated sociological analysis unnecessary. According to Arendt, ‘[t]otalitarian movements are mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals’, individuals whose most conspicuous characteristic is their loyalty to the movement itself. In turn, such loyalty:

. . . can only be expected from the completely isolated human being who, without any other social ties to family, friends, comrades, or even mere acquaintances, derives his sense of having a place in the world only from his belonging to a movement, his membership in a party.116

Arendt adduced no evidence for this human atomization and, again, modern scholarship finds little support for it. The ‘ordinary’ middle-aged Germans who, for instance, composed the police battalions had families and belonged to communities; even on active service, they went to church, enjoyed sporting competitions, drinking sessions and watching movies.117 They were not the social isolates that Arendt’s concept of the ‘masses’ suggests.

Moreover, by describing totalitarian societies as classless, Arendt was deflected from an examination of the strata that totalitarianism leaves intact and their variable proximity to terror and ideology. In the Soviet Union, for instance, intellectuals and party cadres were far more likely to be exposed to arbitrary terror than ordinary wage earners: in fact, the latter were hit harder by the draconian labour laws of 1938 and 1940 (which mandated strict penalties for absenteeism and lateness) than they were by the Great Purges, while for the peasantry the chief trauma was collectivization.118 ‘There was always a radius of terror in Stalin’s Russia that the prefix ‘total’ ignores. ‘To sit at the bottom’ and avoid responsibility ‘was safer’ than occupying a position closer to the pinnacle of power.119 Nadezhda Mandelstam recalled that:

. . . people talked much more freely and openly in working-class homes than in intellectual ones in those savage times. After all the equivocations of Moscow and the frantic attempts
to justify the terror, we were quite startled to hear the mercifully outspoken way in which our hosts talked.\textsuperscript{120}

True, in contrast to Nazi Germany, most Soviet citizens were fearful of the regime, knowing all too well the waves of terror it could unleash. But this co-existed less with ideological fervour or one-dimensional dogmatism than with resentment of party privilege, scepticism – ‘a refusal to take the regime’s most serious pronouncements fully seriously was the norm’\textsuperscript{121} – and the proverbial Russian fatalism: ‘This too will pass’.

The regime, as we know, had its supporters among youth, office-holders and party members. Yet in considering \textit{Homo Sovieticus} as a peculiar hybrid, Sheila Fitzpatrick is struck by a species characterized by ‘outward conformity’ rather than motivated by ideology. She observes, ‘\textit{Homo Sovieticus} was a string-puller, an operator, a time-server, a freeloader, a mouter of slogans. . . . But, above all, he was a survivor’.\textsuperscript{122} And survival was facilitated by the Russian facility for speculation and \textit{blat} (‘pull’), which Fitzpatrick defines as ‘a system of reciprocal relationships involving goods and favors that, in contrast to patronage relations, entail equals and are nonhierarchical’, but which Petr Gattsuk, a citizen from Novgorod, characterized in 1940 as little more than ‘swindling, cheating, stealing, speculation, slipshod practices, and so on’.\textsuperscript{123} From the Communist Party’s point of view, this was corruption by another name, a social pestilence that subverted the official economic system by erecting alongside it a ‘second economy based on personal contacts and patronage’. For other citizens, conversely, that parallel economy ameliorated the acute shortages of Soviet life and, Fitzpatrick maintains, ‘was probably more important in ordinary people’s lives than the private sector had ever been during NEP’.\textsuperscript{124} A broadly comparable institution to \textit{blat} in China is known as \textit{guanxiwang}, an ancient practice of mutual aid, based on personal connections, that survived under Maoism, and through which the official ideology of equalitarianism or ‘redness’ was regularly bypassed.\textsuperscript{125} But even without \textit{guanxi}, Mao’s totalitarian determination to transform Chinese society and its people into a ‘virtuocracy’ was self-defeating.\textsuperscript{126} As Susan Shirk shows so well, the Maoist project to destroy self-interest, competitiveness and family preference degenerated into a syndrome of opportunism, sycophancy, patronage, avoidance of activists and privatization that conduced to weakening the very ideology that virtuocracy was supposed to implant.\textsuperscript{127}

\textbf{Conclusion}

To say that Arendt was simply wrong about aspects of totalitarian rule or that she extrapolated beyond what the evidence allowed is only part of the story. She was also an acute observer; indeed, no one has written more perceptively about the permanent revolution that constituted totalitarian ‘movements’. The real problem with Arendt’s analysis lies elsewhere: in her relative inattentiveness to social
relationships and to the impact they had in mediating, refracting and impeding the regime’s goals. However original, her own theory shared a common misconception during the late 1940s and early 1950s that society was principally passive when confronted with the depredations of totalitarian regimes. Social relationships, in Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism, appear to have no vibrancy of their own and rarely surface as objects of sustained investigation. It is the regime’s institutions – the secret police, the party apparatus, the leaders – that command her attention. In contrast, later historians have pinpointed the ‘wide disparity between central pronouncements and local outcomes, the relative autonomy of some social processes, and more ambiguous multicausal origins of terror’. And this was precisely the terrain that Riesman, in those early years, sought to map out, as a corrective to the oppressive analytical weight of the terror-ideology couple.

In this effort, one might add, social science complemented Riesman’s own experimental, pragmatic temperament. It was thus entirely characteristic that while his family suffered no hardship in the Great Depression, the young Riesman decided to learn more about its impact first-hand. Dismayed at the complacent attitudes of affluent friends and acquaintances who refused to believe there was a depression at all, who lambasted Franklin Roosevelt’s call for a New Deal, and who insisted that there was work for those willing to find it, Riesman decided, in the summer of 1934, to test those opinions. Dressed in Levi’s, and carrying a poncho slung over his back, he sought a job in Detroit at the Ford Motor Company River Rouge plant, failed, after repeated attempts, to get one, became sick and lived briefly in a Federal transients’ shelter. There he met craftsmen who had been unwillingly unemployed for three to four years. His conclusion arose neither from logical deduction nor from newspaper accounts but from what he saw with his own eyes: ‘There was real unemployment’, he recorded:

... not malingering, by proud Americans who used the available improvised public services only as a last resort. These wandering men, who had left their families in search of work, were in no way revolutionary. They had retained their faith in America and were convinced that the Great Depression would pass, as other depressions had, and that they would find work again.

Ironically, it was Riesman, the social scientist ostensibly tainted by pseudo-universalistic theory, who was especially sensitive to individual cases and to evidence; and Arendt, supposedly the practitioner of phronesis, who constantly advanced arguments that the material could not bear. Where Riesman discovered distortions or exaggerations within social science perspectives – their tendency towards monolithic interpretations, determinism and procrustean categorizations that effaced the ‘multiplicity of roles’ and ‘emotional responses’ evident among human beings, even under duress – he was ready trenchantly to criticize them. But in another irony, and as we have seen, these are the self-same criticisms that Riesman makes of Arendt herself who, by inference, commits the errors of her putative theoretical adversaries. Riesman challenged the view ‘that social science,
in its effort to probe and understand our times, must necessarily miss the basic evils and the deep irrationalities of totalitarianism'. He insisted tartly that 'a refusal to use all available techniques for examination [of concentration and labour camps] can also appear as a noble disdain for evil'. Moreover, it was not simply Arendt's tendency to rely on 'shaky evidence', to skate 'daringly over documentary lacunae', that disturbed him. It was also her curious argument that, 'while thoroughly unutilitarian in pursuit of such older goals as wealth and power, [totalitarianism] is ferociously efficient in seeking total domination as such'. Against such a view of 'organizational genius' Riesman suspected the 'flatfooted brutality and incompetence' of regimes that were never fully omnipotent.

Notes

I am indebted to Nathan Glazer, David Kettler, and Wilfred McClay for comments on an earlier version of this article.


6. This deliberately minimalist definition approximates the one provided by Arendt herself in (1959) 'Reflections on Little Rock', in Peter Baehr (ed.) (2000) The Portable Hannah Arendt, pp. 231–46. New York: Viking. I cannot here pursue an extended discussion of Arendt's theory of 'society' or the 'social'. Suffice it to say that her frequent characterization of 'the social' as an entity of conformity (rather than distinction) and behaviour (rather than action) severely diminished her ability to see the potential dynamism and creativity of this sphere. Relevant in these respects is Hanna Fenichel Pitkin (1998) The Attack of the Blob. Hannah Arendt's Concept of the Social. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


10. Arendt (n. 8), 233.

11. Ibid.


13. Ibid., p. 238.


15. Ibid., pp. 241–2. Questioning Karl Jaspers’s characterization of Nazi policy as ‘criminal guilt’, Arendt wrote:

   The Nazi crimes, it seems to me, explode the limits of the law; and that is precisely what constitutes their monstrousness. For these crimes, no punishment is severe enough . . . That is, this guilt, in contrast to criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems. That is the reason why the Nazis in Nuremberg are so smug. They know that, of course. And just as inhuman as their guilt is the innocence of the victims. Human beings simply can’t be as innocent as they all were in the face of the gas chambers (the most repulsive usurer was as innocent as the newborn child because no crime deserves such a punishment). We are simply not equipped to deal, on a human, political level, with a guilt that is beyond crime and an innocence that is beyond goodness or virtue.


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23. Daniel Bell, a colleague at the University of Chicago, prompted Riesman’s letter by passing on to him some of Arendt’s writings from Partisan Review.


25. Ibid.

26. Over a seven-year period, as a boy, Riesman attended the Wednesday Quaker Friends Meeting sessions at the William Penn Charter School in Philadelphia. See Riesman, ‘Becoming an Academic Man’, in Bennet M. Berger (ed.) (1990) Authors of their Own Lives: Intellectual Autobiographies by Twenty American Sociologists, pp. 22–74, at p. 26. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. As an undergraduate at Harvard College, where he majored in biochemical sciences, Riesman was a pacifist but, during the 1930s, came to favour American intervention. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 was a watershed in his political views: from then onwards, ‘the theme that unifies my political attitudes has remained that of the danger of nuclear war and the destruction of entire populations, perhaps of half the planet’. Yet there was to be no return to pacifism. During the Cold War, Riesman supported ‘the strategy of a minimum deterrent’ as a basic insurance policy against a Soviet first strike. He observed that ‘the danger of nuclear weapons is the principal danger facing the planet, and that all other hazards, whether the greenhouse effect, or desertification, or world hunger, are, in comparison, manageable by human intelligence and ingenuity’ (‘A Personal Memoir: My Political Journey’, in Walter W. Powell and Richard Robbins (eds) (1984) Conflict and Consensus: A Festschrift in Honor of Lewis S. Coser, pp. 327–64, at pp. 339, 344, 348. New York: Free Press. See also Riesman, ‘Academic Man’, p. 68, n. 18).

27. On this experience, ibid., pp. 38–40. ‘The very first case I worked on dispelled any illusion that Brandeis himself would be influenced by empirical data when in pursuit of the larger goals of creating precedents for federal judicial restraint’ (p. 39).

28. Ibid., p. 54.

29. Ibid., p. 58.


31. Glazer knew Hannah Arendt independently of David Riesman. He met her when she first came to the US and while she worked as an editor of Schocken books, as well as during the time she was writing for Commentary, on which Glazer was an editor, and for other Jewish publications such as Memorial Journal and Jewish Frontier (personal communication with Professor Glazer).

32. The original, 1950 edn of The Lonely Crowd opens with the illustration of ‘political apathy’. The abridged paperback Doubleday 1953 edn omits this and other examples but offers many clarifications of method and substance. It shows the underestimated influence of Nathan Glazer and also some subtle updating by Riesman. As Riesman remarked (p. 6), the 1953 Doubleday edn was ‘not only an abridgement’ (approximately four-fifths as long as the edn of 1950) but ‘to some extent a new edition, for many
passages have been rewritten and others rearranged'. Parenthetically, while the listing of authors in the 1st edn of *The Lonely Crowd* is Riesman, Denney, Glazer, in the Doubleday paperback and all subsequent paperback edns of the book, it is Riesman, Glazer, Denney. Glazer's important role in abridging and rewriting the original text probably explains this switch in authorial sequence.

33. The data were incorporated into C. Wright Mills (1951) *White Collar*. New York: Oxford University Press. On the contrast between Riesman's concept of 'veto groups' and Mills's notion of a 'power elite', see 'Foreword: Ten Years Later', pp. xxii ff. to the 1960 edn of *The Lonely Crowd*, and also *The Lonely Crowd*, ch. 11.


35. Denney's speciality was popular culture. The division of labour among Riesman, Glazer and Denney is clarified in Riesman et al. (n. 33), pp. xlvii–xlviii.

36. Some of this material constituted the 21 portraits, composed of 180 interviews, delineated in Riesman and Glazer (n. 30).

37. Riesman et al. (n. 33), p. xiii.

38. Shortly before Riesman had left Chicago to begin his research at Yale, he had been busy working up a course on 'Culture and Personality'. See Riesman (1990: n. 26), 57.

39. In the Doubleday edn (p. 48), the authors emphasize the heuristic nature of their discussion, saying that 'the types of character and society dealt with in this book are *types*: they do not exist in reality, but are a construction, based on a selection of certain historical problems for investigation'.

40. Riesman–Arendt Correspondence (n. 22), image 27.

41. '[B]ecause this type . . . is to be found today in such Catholic countries as France, Italy and possibly those in Latin America, a much greater extent than in Protestant countries'. Ibid., image 5.

42. Riesman (n. 2), 185–209.

43. Riesman–Arendt Correspondence (n. 22), images 4–5, letter of 21 May 1948.

44. Ibid. This letter also includes the observation that 'modern philosophy has long had a tendency to destroy every idea of man as an autonomous being: You are what life makes of you; you are your destiny; etc.', image 5.

45. Ibid.

46. 'Masses', in Arendt's lexicon, are equivalent neither to economic classes nor mobs, but instead refer to people of all classes who have been uprooted by war, revolution and unemployment from a stable 'world' whose atomization conduces to an erosion of a sense of reality. These people, made 'superfluous' through social dislocation, are, Arendt argues, the prime candidates of totalitarian movements. See Arendt (n. 3), 351–2, and the discussion in Margaret Canovan, 'Arendt's Theory of Totalitarianism: A Reassessment', in Dana Villa (ed.) (2000) *The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt*, pp. 25–43, at 31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

47. Riesman–Arendt Correspondence (n. 22), image 9, letter of 9 March 1949. Riesman would not have known that Riesman himself was active in the defense of Japanese Americans immediately after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. He described this involvement as 'my first directly political action' (1984: n. 26), 337. On Riesman's campaigning in Washington against the deportation of West Coast Japanese Americans, see Riesman (1990: n. 26), 66, n. 6.

48. The connection is a leitmotif of *The Lonely Crowd* but is especially emphasized in the subsection on 'The Adjusted, the Anomic, the Autonomous', pp. 287–91. Arendt must also have found the psychoanalytic language ('superego controls', 'clinical symptom') and
metaphors that pervade The Lonely Crowd particularly grating. Following a quotation on the emotional condition of soldiers hospitalized for apathy, Riesman remarks (n. 2), 190:

My own belief is that the ambulatory patients in the ward of modern culture show many analogous symptoms of too much compliance and too little insight, though of course their symptoms are not as sudden and severe. Their lack of emotion and emptiness of expression are as characteristic of many contemporary anomics as hysteria or outlawry was characteristic of the societies depending on earlier forms of direction.

49. Riesman–Arendt Correspondence (n. 22), image 9, letter of 9 March 1949.
50. Ibid.
51. Later, Arendt spelt out the concept of ‘world’ that is implicit in this letter to Riesman: e.g. (1958) The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. While ‘the earth’ designates the terrestrial sphere of physical and organic life, ‘the world’ refers to the cultural, technological, and political artefacts that lend human existence a modicum of stability. People relate to this world analogously to how people sit around a table: the world is common but we see it from different vantage points; the world both brings us together and separates us; this separation is a condition of human freedom and diversity. The world (civilization) is produced primarily by work (‘fabrication’). ‘Worldlessness’ is that condition in which people lose the sense of a common world; they become cynical, lose their grasp on reality, mistake the world as it is for their own feelings about it. In short, worldlessness is a condition of unreality, acutely felt by modern ‘masses’, and generally produced by social meltdown (the status of the refugee or the superfluous person) attendant on massive disruption (e.g. the breakdown of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires after the First World War).
52. Riesman–Arendt Correspondence (n. 22), image 10, letter of 9 March 1949. In a later comment on the ‘other directed type’, Arendt speculated on people who live under the misapprehension that normalcy ‘is something in the flesh’ (as distinct from a medium of measurement) and who are not satisfied with the respect of their community but want ‘the impossible [namely] the active approval, amounting to friendship, of exactly everybody’, a craving that paradoxically makes friendship impossible too. Arendt to Riesman, 13 June 1949, image 21.
53. Perhaps a reference to Henry Friend, whose portrait appears in Riesman and Glazer (n. 30), 441–84.
54. Riesman–Arendt Correspondence (n. 22), image 6, letter of 25 May 1948.
55. Riesman’s assumption that Arendt was a historian, rather than a political theorist or philosopher, is a common refrain of the early letters.
56. Riesman–Arendt Correspondence (n. 22), image 5, letter of 11 Nov. 1948. (The image, in the digitized archive, is out of chronological sequence.) See also images 6 and 7, letter of 25 May 1948.
58. (1953: n. 32), 5. See also (n. 30), p. v: ‘In fact, the concepts of social character set forth in The Lonely Crowd were developed almost accidentally in working with the vignettes of a few individuals’.
60. Arendt and Jaspers (n. 15), 236, letter of 21 Dec. 1953. For Arendt’s conviction that the ‘social sciences, as “behavioural sciences”, aim to reduce man as a whole, in all his activities, to the level of a conditioned and behaving animal’, see Arendt (n. 51), 45; cf. 43, 323.
61. Riesman–Arendt Correspondence (n. 2), image 8, letter of 28 Feb. 1949.

63. Riesman–Arendt Correspondence (n. 22), image 17, 13 June 1949.

64. Ibid., image 47, 6 Oct. 1949.


66. Riesman–Arendt Correspondence (n. 22), image 15.

67. Ibid.


70. The remonstration runs deeper because one of Riesman’s criticisms of social science – that it ‘tended to imagine social systems as monolithic’ – is also one of his criticisms of Arendt: see image 15, letter of 8 June 1949 and (1952) ‘Some Observations on the Limits of Totalitarian Power’, in Riesman (n. 65), 414–25, at p. 422; cf. p. 422, n. 6, for a comment on Arendt.

71. (n. 65), 410. ‘In general . . . she tends to make totalitarianism appear as consistently fanatical; she therefore interprets specific actions in terms of long-range goals, and does not allow for any more or less accidental concatenations of bureaucratic forces, slip-ups, careerisms, as explanatory factors’ (n. 69), image 61.

72. Riesman (1952: n. 70), 415.


74. Riesman (1952: n. 70), 415.

75. Ibid. Thus Riesman anticipated Arendt’s later concern that Adolf Eichmann not be elevated to a figure of Satanic grandeur but understood for the nonentity that she claimed he was.

76. Riesman’s animus against Nineteen Eight Four looks jarring until one considers the kind of interpretation the book allows. So, for Richard Rorty, Nineteen Eighty Four lends credence to the claim ‘that there is no such thing as inner freedom’ and that there ‘is nothing to people except what has been socialized into them’: (1989) Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 177.

77. See Arendt (n. 8), 240, on the ‘disintegration of the personality’.

78. Arendt (n. 3), 447.


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81. Arendt (n. 3), 459.
82. Ibid., p. 455.
84. Ibid., p. 457.
85. First published in 1953 (later appended to the 1958 edn of Origins), 'Ideology and Terror' post-dates the period I am examining but the essay's main line of argument is discernible in the drafts of Origins that Riesman consulted. Note that 'Ideology and Terror' refers principally to the 'inhabitants of a totalitarian country' (Arendt (n. 3), 468); it deals with concentration and death camps only by allusion.
86. (1951) The Burden of Our Time. London: Secker & Warburg, p. 428. She remarked:

... the chances are that total domination of man will never come about, for it presupposes the existence of one authority, one way of life, one ideology in all countries and among all peoples in the world. Only when no competitor, no country of physical refuge, and no human being whose understanding may offer a spiritual refuge, are left can the process of total domination and the change of the nature of man begin in earnest.

The remarks were expunged from later edns.
87. Recall that I am talking about Origins. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt does give examples of resistance, though these overwhelmingly take place outside of Germany itself. It is notable that Arendt's philosophical master work, The Human Condition (pp. 320–2) ends on a similar note of almost unreserved gloom: the 'victory of the animal laborans'. She remarks:

... even now, laboring is too lofty, too ambitious a word for what we are doing, or think we are doing, in the world we have come to live in. The last stage of the laboring society, the society of jobholders, demands of its members a sheer automatic functioning. ... It is quite conceivable that the modern age – which began with such an unprecedented and promising outburst of human activity – may end in the deadliest, most sterile passivity history has ever known.
88. As Riesman observed about her view of totalitarianism as a whole: (n. 22), image 15, letter of 8 June 1949.
89. (1960: n. 26), 67, n. 10.
90. Riesman (1952: n. 70), 425.
91. Ibid., p. 423.
92. Ibid., p. 420.
93. On Arendt's reckoning, while Nazi Germany entered its totalitarian phase after 1938 (and thus five years after her own flight), the Soviet Union was totalitarian 'after 1930': see 'Mankind and Terror', in Jerome Kohn (ed.) (1994) Essays in Understanding, pp. 297–306, at 297. New York: Harcourt Brace. In other words, Riesman, unlike Arendt, had actually witnessed in person a totalitarian society.
94. Riesman (1952: n. 70), 421.
95. Riesman (1952: n. 70), 421.
96. Riesman (1952: n. 70), 416.
97. Ibid., p. 410.
99. Heinrich Blücher, misquoting Riesman, contemptuously dismissed the charge:

The book [Origins] will outlast the troublemakers, and you can set your mind at rest.

Mr Riesman revenged himself with a swipe at you in a review of one of Margaret
Mead’s scribblings, where he felt that her work was so much more substantial than the ‘mystical insights of Hannah Arendt’.


100. Riesman (n. 98), 246.
101. It is worth noting that while the original edn of The Lonely Crowd (p. 296) states that ‘modern totalitarianism . . . wages open and effective war on autonomy’, the 1953 Doubleday edition (p. 288), omits the word ‘effective’, adds the rider that ‘modern totalitarianism is also more inefficient and corrupt than it is often given credit for’, and observes that while the aims of totalitarianism are unlimited, its ‘effectiveness’ is still unknown. The emendation likely reflected Riesman’s criticisms of Arendt.
102. Riesman (1952: n. 70), 421.
103. This was a criticism of Arendt that emerged in the Commentary review, image 61.
104. Riesman–Arendt Correspondence (n. 22), image 16, letter of 8 June 1949.
106. Riesman–Arendt Correspondence (n. 22), image 23, letter of 13 June 1949.
107. Riesman (1952: n. 70), 419–20, n. 4. The statement I have quoted is not verbatim Arendt, but Riesman’s abbreviated recollection. For a description of the ‘underground struggle’ in Buchenwald, see Eugen Kogon ([1950] 1998) The Theory and Practice of Hell. New York: Berkley Books, pp. 255–73. In the 1966 Preface to Part III of Origins (p. xvii) Arendt stated that ‘Corruption, the curse of the Russian administration from the beginning, was also present during the last years of the Nazi regime’.
111. Ibid., p. 78. See also pp. 87–100.
112. Todorov (n. 80), 40.
113. Ibid., pp. 59–118.
114. Arendt (n. 3), p. 420. Nor was the regime as a whole able to drill its ideology (e.g. of
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116. Arendt (n. 3), 323–4. On p. 318, Arendt qualifies this picture by writing of the masses as ‘good family men’ who sacrificed ‘belief, honor, dignity’ for security.


120. Ibid., p. 339.

121. Fitzpatrick (n. 118), 222.

122. Ibid., p. 222.

123. Ibid., pp. 62–3.

124. Ibid., pp. 65–6.

125. It is the persistence of this venerable institution, largely family-based but also involving reciprocal obligations to those of a similar (school, town, military) background, that partially explains how Chinese enterprise was able to grow so quickly once Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Open Door’ reforms began in the late 1970s. Exiles from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and elsewhere returned to their home communities where, welcomed enthusiastically, they were able to invest and strike highly personalized deals with local leaders. See Lucian W. Pye (2000) “Asian Values”: From Dynamos to Dominoes?, in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (eds) Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, pp. 244–55. New York: Basic Books. Also, on guanxi during the Cultural Revolution, see Ruth Cherrington (1997) Deng’s Generation: Young Intellectuals in 1980s China. London: Macmillan, pp. 94–5.


129. The state may have sought to ‘swallow’ society but, as Suny notes:

...it was unable to realize the vision presented by totalitarian theory of a complete atomized society. The limits of state power were met when people refused to work efficiently, migrated from place to place by the millions, or informally worked out ways to resist pressure from above.


132. Riesman (n. 65), 410–11, emphasis added.
133. Ibid., p. 411. In 1954, Riesman and Arendt joined other participants in a conference on totalitarianism organized by Carl J. Friedrich but Riesman’s contributions add nothing of substance to what he had already argued. See Friedrich (n. 5). For Riesman’s contributions (the book has no index), see pp. 132–3, 227–8, 377–8. For Arendt’s, see pp. 75–9, 133–4, 228–9, 336–8. Friedrich was Riesman’s mentor on political matters. On their relationship, see Riesman (1990: n. 26), 30–1, 37–8, 42, 50.
134. Commentary review (n. 22), image 62.